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Legally Correct But  
Technologically Off the Mark 
By Daniel B. Garrie* & Bill Spernow **
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
¶1 Today’s judges face numerous challenges in determining the truth of the matter at 
hand, but none is more challenging than ruling on issues that pivot on digital evidence.1  
Gone are the days when the most technically challenging decision was determining if 
evidence on a floppy disk2 had been destroyed because a litigant exposed it to a strong 
magnetic field.3  Today’s legal challenges are extremely technical when it comes to 
determining the integrity of digital evidence and assigning responsibility for direct or 
indirect acts of spoliation.4  While judges are entirely capable of arriving at the correct 
decision when it comes to ruling on the value of digital evidence,5 they are at the mercy 
of the “experts” involved when it comes to issues of spoliation.6
 
* Mr. Daniel Garrie, Esq., B.A. & M.A. Computer Science is a lawyer and technologist, and is 
recognized as one of the eminent thought leaders specializing in electronic discovery.  Mr. Garrie is a 
managing partner at Focused Solution Recourse Delivery Group LLC (FSRDG), a national legal risk 
management consulting firm, and serves as an e-Discovery arbitrator and special master all over the United 
States.  He has also held technology positions in both the private and public sector.  He can be reached at 
dgarrie@fsrdg.com. 
 
** Mr. Bill Spernow, MBA, CISSP, CEH, PMP, Net+, Sec+, CHS III, GAPPI/GCP combined a career as 
a computer engineer and California Police Officer and quickly obtained a national reputation as one of the 
first Cyber Cops.  He has held IT Security positions in both the public and private sectors and currently 
provides litigation and forensic support services in the Atlanta area. 
Special thank you to Mr. Elan Raffel. Mr. Raffel is entering his second year at Cardozo Law School of 
Yeshiva University in New York and is interested in practicing corporate law when he graduates. 
1 Eckhardt v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:06CV512-H, 2008 WL 1995310, at *6 (W.D.N.C. May 6, 2008) 
(finding that the defendant did not act in bad faith but commenting on the challenges raised by “the 
changing face of discovery in an electronic world”). 
2 A floppy disk is a “[s]mall removable disk[], also known as [a] diskette[], that come[s] in two sizes, 
3.5” and 5.25”.  The amount of data that can be stored on a diskette depends on the size, and can be 360 
kilobytes to 1.4 megabytes.”  TOM O’CONNOR, LEGAL ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT INSTITUTE, BASIC 
PRINCIPLES OF AUTOMATED LITIGATION SUPPORT 51 (2005), available at http://www.legal-
edocs.org/Basic%20Principles%20of%20Automated%20LitigationSupport%20Primer.pdf. 
3 Nathan Wiebe, Regarding Digital Images: Determining Courtroom Admissibility Standards, 28 MAN. 
L.J. 61, 63 (2002). 
4 Spoliation can be defined as “the destruction or alteration of evidence during on-going litigation or 
during an investigation or when either might occur sometime in the future.  Failure to preserve data that 
may become evidence is also spoliation.”  Spoliation—Working EDRM, EDRM: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
REFERENCE MODEL, http://edrm.net/wiki2/index.php/Spoliation#ref_fenwickglossary (last visited Sept. 6, 
2010). 
5 “According to Black’s law dictionary, evidence is ‘any species of proof, or probative matter, legally 
presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records, 
documents, exhibits, concrete objects, etc. for the purpose of inducing belief in the minds of the court or 
jury as to their contention.’  Electronic information (like paper) generally is admissible into evidence in a 
legal proceeding.”  eDiscovery Glossary, RENEWDATA, http://www.renewdata.com/ediscovery-
glossary.php#e (last visited Sept. 6, 2010) (defining electronic evidence).  Digital evidence can be defined 
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¶2 In an expanding trend, judges are basing important decisions on inaccurate or 
incomplete technical details concerning digital evidence.7
¶3 We have identified a group of recent cases where digital evidence played a 
significant role in the judicial decisions.  From this group a single case was selected to 
serve as a “test case” for our thesis.  The remainder of this article will discuss the 
decisions reached in this “test case,” and demonstrate how a limited understanding  of 
low-level computer functions,
  As a result, for cases where 
digital evidence plays a pivotal role, either dangerously erroneous precedent will be 
established based upon legally sound but technically flawed logic, or successful appeals 
will increase dramatically as the technical weaknesses of the decision are subsequently 
exposed.  This thesis—that technological ignorance leads to legal error—is the primary 
focus behind this article. 
8
¶4 At this point a disclaimer is in order.  To present our argument, we need to discuss 
technical issues related to computer storage techniques
 especially at the level where files are created and deleted, 
contributed to legal decisions by the court that were fundamentally incorrect. 
9 and file structures.10
¶5 The case we selected to highlight is TR Investors, LLC v. Genger.
  Clearly the 
restricted length of this article prevents a detailed discussion.  Where possible, analogies 
will be used to compensate.  In other cases we ask that you to take our word that the 
opinions presented are expert ones formed after decades of experience with cases 
involving digital evidence.  Our goal is not to overwhelm you with technical-level geek 
talk, rather to help you to come away from the article with a deeper, but common sense 
appreciation for the impact a limited understanding of computer technology can have on 
even the most basic of judicial decisions. 
11  In Genger a 
determination of spoliation was made by the Delaware Court of Chancery, and Vice 
Chancellor Strine sanctioned defendant Arie Genger for his actions.12  The sanctions were 
issued due to the defendant’s involvement in overwriting the content of deleted files in 
the “unallocated space” of computers under his control.13
 
as “[a]ny computer-generated data that is relevant to a case.  Included are email, text documents, 
spreadsheets, images, database files, deleted email and files and back-ups.  The data may be on desktops, 
laptops, servers, hard drive, backup tape, CD or DVD.”  TransPerfect Legal FAQs, TRANSPERFECT LEGAL 
SOLUTIONS, http://www.transperfect.com/TLS/resources/resources_faq.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010) 
(defining Electronic Stored Information (ESI)). 
  The first part of the article will 
6 Mark D. Robins, Computers And The Discovery of Evidence—A New Dimension To Civil Procedure. 
174 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 509–10 (1999). 
7 Eric Van Buskirk, Digital Evidence: Challenging the Presumption of Reliability. J. DIGITAL FORENSIC 
PRAC., 19, 22–23 (2006). 
8 In programming, a computer function can be defined as a self-contained software routine that performs 
a task.  Functions can do large amounts of processing as well as small tasks. 
9 Computer storage refers to the act of placing information on a disk where it available for later use.  
O’CONNOR, supra note 2. 
10 “The file structure of a program refers to the way information on a disk or tape is organized.  
Programs often need to read data from files and write information to files in order to keep permanent 
records.  How these files are organized and used is an important part of the design of a program.”  Randall 
Davis, The Nature Of Software And Its Consequences For Establishing And Evaluating, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 
299, 320 (1992). 
11 TR Investors, LLC v. Genger, No. 3994-VCS, 2009 WL 4696062 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2009). 
12 Id. at *17–19. 
13 Id. at *7 n.21 (citing Ohana Aff. at ¶ 13, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Genger Aff. at ¶¶ 12–14, 
Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Tr. at 257:4–258:2, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062). 
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focus on the decision itself.  We will then discuss why, in our considered opinion, the 
court’s decision was incorrect. 
II. TR INVESTORS, LLC V. GENGER 
¶6 The storage systems of most computers have two primary areas where files14 reside.  
Those two areas are “existing file space” where valid files can be found, and deleted-free 
space,15 or more globally “unallocated space,”16 which for purposes of analogy can be 
considered as a garbage dump where unwanted and discarded information goes to await 
recycling.  This “garbage dump” space exists on every hard drive17 and server,18 and is 
what forensic experts typically examine when recovering deleted files that have been 
emptied from the recycle bin.19
¶7 In the Genger case, the court determined that a consultant employed by the 
defendant had used a wiping utility
 
20 to overwrite the unallocated space of a desktop 
computer with the intention of preventing the plaintiff from recovering deleted files 
relevant to the case.  The court reached this conclusion after it was informed by the 
plaintiff’s computer experts that electronic versions of documents known to be in the 
defendant’s possession could not be located as either valid21
 
14 A “file” can be defined as “[a] collection of data or information that has a name, called the filename.  
Almost all information stored in a computer must be in a file.  There are many different types of files: data 
files, text files, program files, directory files, and so on.”  E-Discovery Knowledge Center: Search the 
Glossary, FIOS, INC., http://www.fiosinc.com/e-discovery-knowledge-center/electronic-discovery-
glossary.aspx?cid=DG (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
 or deleted files on the 
15 “Deleted Data” is “[d]ata that once existed on a computer and has subsequently been deleted by the 
user.  Deleted data actually remains on the computer until it is overwritten by new data or ‘wiped’ with a 
specific software program.”  LEGAL ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT INSTITUTE, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 
AUTOMATED LITIGATION SUPPORT 74 (2005) available at http://www.legal-
edocs.org/Basic%20Principles%20of%20Automated%20LitigationSupport%20Primer.pdf. 
16 “Unallocated space” is “space on a hard drive that potentially contains intact files, remnants of files, 
subdirectories, or temporary files which were created and then deleted by either a computer application, the 
operating system or the operator.”  eDiscovery Glossary, RENEWDATA, 
http://www.renewdata.com/ediscovery-glossary.php#e (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
17 The “hard drive” is “the primary computer storage medium in desktop and laptop computers.”  Hard 
Drive—EDRM, EDRM: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL, 
http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Hard_drive (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
18 A “server” is “[a]ny computer on a network that contains data or applications shared by users of the 
network on their client PCs.”  Glossary of Terms, KROLL ONTRACK 9 (Oct. 1, 2008), 
http://www.krollontrack.com/library/glossary_krollontrack2008.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
19 The “recycle bin” on a computer is the location on the hard drive where deleted folders or files are 
temporarily stored.  The recycle bin keeps the files intact in case the user wants to restore them, but can be 
completely erased from the computer by the user. 
20 Wipe is the “term for deliberately overwriting a piece of media and removing any tract of files or file 
fragments.”  Wipe—EDRM, EDRM: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL, 
http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Wipe (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
21 “Active data is information residing on the direct access storage media of computer systems, which is 
readily visible to the operating system and/or application software with which it was created and 
immediately accessible to users without undeletion, modification or reconstruction (i.e., word processing 
and spreadsheet files, programs and files used by the computer’s operating system).”  Glossary of Terms, 
KROLL ONTRACK 1 (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.krollontrack.com/library/glossary_krollontrack2008.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
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defendant’s computer systems.22  The inability to forensically locate these documents in 
digital form resulted in sanctions against the defendant Genger.23
¶8 Our review of the actions taken by all involved, per the court record, establishes 
that the court, through no fault of its own, reached the wrong conclusions on several 
levels.  Had the court been properly informed of the following technical facts, it is highly 
likely that it would have reached a more informed decision in favor of the defendant.  
Genger involved the battle for control of an investment company known as TRI.
  
24  The 
dispute was between the Trump Group, the new owners, and Arie Genger, the original 
owner.25  As is standard in such cases, the court entered a “status quo order,” enjoining 
both parties from “tampering with, destroying, or in any way disposing of any 
[c]ompany-related documents, books, or records.”26
¶9 The problem was that the court acknowledged Mr. Genger as an “international man 
of mystery,”
 
27 who had used TRI’s computer system not just to conduct TRI business, 28 
but to create and receive documents implicating Israel’s national security and as a storage 
device for his own personal financial and legal documents.29  To protect the sensitive 
documents, TRI retained a law firm that in turn engaged a forensic consulting firm to 
untangle this Gordian knot.30
¶10 Over the course of a weekend, the court permitted the defendant’s attorneys and 
consultants to open documents and e-mails on the TRI computers and encrypt those files 
containing personal and Israeli government information.
 
31  The consulting firm created 
file level snapshots of the “existing files” on the potentially responsive hard drives.32  
However, as is common in e-discovery cases, the consultants never created a forensic 
image33 of the entire hard drive, which would have included all of the unallocated space 
allowing it to be preserved for additional forensic analysis.  After the consultants took a 
“snapshot” of the existing valid files, the computers and hard drives were reviewed by the 
law firm in accordance to the process agreed to by the parties.34  Where Genger’s 
personal items were discovered on these systems, the court permitted these items to be 
individually encrypted.35
 
22 TR Investors, LLC v. Genger, No. 3994-VCS, 2009 WL 4696062, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2009). 
  Once an encrypted version of the file was created the original 
was deleted using the standard delete function of the Windows operating system.  The 
court acknowledged that during this encryption process, non-encrypted, temporary copies 
23 Id. at *15–20. 
24 Id. at *1–15. 
25 Id. at *1. 
26 Id. at *1 n.1 (citing Status Quo Order, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062). 
27 Id. at *5. 
28 Id. at *15–20. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at *11. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at *12. 
33 A Forensic Image or Copy is a “precise bit-by-bit copy of a computer system’s hard drive, including 
slack and unallocated space.”  O’CONNOR, supra note 2. 
34 Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *5–6. 
35 Encryption can be defined as the “[a] procedure that renders the contents of a message or file 
scrambled or unintelligible to anyone not authorized to read it.”  Glossary of Terms, AMERICAN DOCUMENT 
MANAGEMENT, http://www.amdoc.com/section/Glossary/18/interior.php#E (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
Vol. 9:1] Daniel B. Garrie et al. 
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of Genger’s documents were created in the unallocated space of the hard drive.36
¶11 Apparently motivated by this concern, Genger and his technical advisor later ran a 
wiping software program on the unallocated space after the file level review had been 
completed, destroying (by overwriting) all previous data contained in the unallocated 
space, before turning over the computers and hard drives to the Trump Group.
  Those 
temporary copies, if recovered later from the unallocated space, would have defeated the 
point of the encryption process. 
37
¶12 Although Genger did create a file level copy of the computer systems in order to 
have a snapshot of every valid file on the system, the court found Genger’s actions of 
wiping the unallocated space to be a deliberate attempt at spoliation.
 
38  As a result, the 
court imposed a series of heavy sanctions upon Genger, fining him and shifting the 
burden of proof to him.39  The court’s logic in imposing sanctions was based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of unallocated computer space and the data 
that resides within that space.  Moreover, in imposing sanctions upon Genger, Vice 
Chancellor Strine has expanded preservation orders in the Delaware courts to include 
unallocated space in all computers and servers involved in litigation—an unintended 
result that is unworkable, unreasonable, and prohibitively expensive.40
III. WHY THE COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS WAS WRONG  
 
¶13 The court’s logic in imposing sanctions was faulty on a number of technical levels.  
While the defendant wiped the unallocated space of these hard drives, it was only after 
first taking and saving externally a file-level snapshot of the “existing files” on the hard 
drives in question.41  After any sensitive documents that contained national security or 
personal information were encrypted the protocol required that the original hard drives be 
turned over to the plaintiff.  It was this “turn-over” protocol requirement that triggered 
the wiping of unallocated space.  The wiping was necessary to delete unencrypted copies 
of the sensitive documents automatically generated as part of the encryption process.42  It 
should be noted that after the encryption process was completed, thousands of sensitive 
files (that were not encrypted) which had been deleted now resided in the unallocated 
space.  The later use of forensic analysis tools by the plaintiff would have allowed for the 
recovery of a significant percentage of these sensitive files in their original state.  The 
court was wrong to find spoliation and impose sanctions for a number of reasons.  Our 
first example is significant: the court did not properly determine if the wiping software 
had destroyed relevant documents.43
 
36 Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *5 n.13 (citing Leicht Aff. at ¶¶ 1–4, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Tr. 
at 251:6–252:11, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062). 
  In its opinion, the court references a memorandum, 
37 Id. at *7. 
38 Id. at *17 
39 Id. at *19. 
40 Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-Discovery 
Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2007), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article9.pdf. 
41 Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *6. 
42 See John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court orders calling 
for forensic imaging of media primarily for the purpose of preservation was an abuse of discretion, citing 
the fact that the record lacked any evidence that defendants have intentionally destroyed relevant ESI and 
noting the significant privacy and confidentiality concerns raised by the order). 
43 Phillips v. Potter, No. 7-815, 2009 WL 1362049, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2009) (finding there was no 
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the “Lentz Memo,” as one of the missing documents that could have been recovered from 
unallocated space as a deleted file—assuming the unallocated space had not been wiped 
by the defendant.44  The court’s determination, however, was based solely on cause and 
effect (it should be here, it’s not, hence it must have been wiped), not independently 
verifiable forensic evidence.45
¶14 What the court perhaps did not fully understand is that every action, including just 
turning on the computer in the morning, creates, deletes, and modifies hundreds of files 
and overwrites data in the unallocated space.
  In addition, other technological reasons related to the 
normal day-to-day operation of any Windows-based computer system would also explain 
why the missing files could not be found in the unallocated space. 
46  Given the nature of the encryption 
process expressly permitted by the court, it is more than likely that all, or almost all, of 
the data assumed to be available for recovery by the court in the unallocated space had 
already been overwritten.47  This is because, as the court recognized, the encryption 
process creates at least one or more temporary files, a final “encrypted” file, and the need 
to delete the original file.  All of this activity consumes resources in the unallocated space 
area of the hard drive.48
 
evidence of destruction of relevant documents and refusing to order sanctions based upon “mere 
speculation” that relevant documents were destroyed, also noting that there was no indication of any bad 
intent on the part of the defendant); Wong v. Thomas, No. 05-2588 (AET), 2008 WL 4224923, at *4 
(D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2008) (
  Given the large number of documents reviewed over the course 
denying motion for sanctions due to inability to establish relevance); Pandora 
Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 4533902, at *9–10 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008) 
(refusing to impose sanctions based on lack of evidence of data’s relevancy); School-Link Techs., Inc. v. 
Applied Res., Inc., No. 05-2088-JWL, 2007 WL 677647, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (refusing to order 
sanctions despite finding that the defendant breached its duty to preserve evidence as there was no showing 
that the breach caused relevant documents and information to be destroyed); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 955 (D. Minn. 1999) (The court was not convinced that defendant could show that evidence 
pertinent to the litigation was actually destroyed.  Additionally, even if information had been deleted—for 
example, when Defendant’s counsel overwrote inactive data while attempting to make a copy of the laptop 
hard drive—the court found that Lexis-Nexis had failed to demonstrate that the loss of this evidence would 
prejudice its case.); Hildreth Mfg., LLC v. Semco, Inc., 785 N.E.2d 774, 780–81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that sanctions for deleting e-data were unwarranted when there was no reasonable possibility that 
data was relevant). 
44 Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *11 n.34 (citing Mem. from David Lentz to Arie Genger, William 
Dowd, and Christopher Gengaro, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062 [hereinafter Lentz Memo]). 
45 See Technical Sales Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., Nos. 07-11745, 08-13365, 2009 WL 
728520, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2009) (denying the defendant's motion for contempt since the 
stipulated order protected the “discovery of actual data, not the absence of data”); see also Se. Mech. 
Servs., Inc., v. Brody, No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 WL 2242395, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009) 
(denying the defendants’ motion to impose sanctions against the plaintiff despite finding of spoliation 
because plaintiff did not act in bad faith and the defendants failed to show that any “crucial evidence” 
existed on the destroyed backup tapes). 
46 Mintel Int’l Group, Ltd. v. Neergheen, No. 08-cv-3939, 2010 WL 145786, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 
2010) (The court found that any programs on the laptop that would have destroyed metadata, such as 
antivirus software, were not user initiated.  The court held that the defendant’s destruction of any evidence 
was unintentional, resulting from typical computer use―rather than a pattern that is easily recognized by 
forensic experts as spoliation.  (Emphasis in original.)); see Christopher D. Wall & Michelle S. Lange, 
Electronic Discovery: Recent Developments, WASH. LAWYER (Mar. 2003), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/march_2003/electronic.cfm, 
(noting that “[s]imply booting a computer can possibly destroy valuable metadata (data about the data, such 
as to, from, bcc, and date fields in e-mail and the ‘last accessed’ or ‘last modified’ date in a document) that 
could be relevant in a lawsuit”) (citing Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders. Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652–54 
(D. Minn. 2002)). 
47 Mintel, 2010 WL 145786, at *8; Wall & Lange, supra note 46. 
48 See Allman, supra note 40. 
Vol. 9:1] Daniel B. Garrie et al. 
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of days by a team of attorneys, any data in the unallocated space could have easily been 
overwritten by the encryption process itself, or the normal day-to-day operation of the 
computer.49  Thus, the Vice Chancellor’s order, by permitting the encryption of files 
stored on the systems in question, most likely resulted in overwriting substantial blocks 
of data that previously had existed in the unallocated space.  If, as the court found, there 
was a smaller dedicated unallocated space for electronic mail and email attachments, then 
all email derived data in this smaller, segregated segment was almost certainly 
overwritten before the wiping software was utilized.50  If the Lentz Memo, as an example, 
had been deleted from the unallocated space, it could have been innocently overwritten 
by the thousands of files created during the encryption process specifically allowed by 
the court.51  So even if the defendant did not run the wiping software, the Lentz Memo 
may well have never been found due to the impact the normal day-to-day operations of 
the computer has on the unallocated space.  Its absence does not demonstrate that the 
defendant intentionally wiped it.52
¶15 It is also unclear if the file-level copying process created a copy of the $MFT file 
for each computer backed up.  This is important because the $MFT file, a Windows 
system file that is really a small database, contains technical details about all valid files 
and most deleted files.
 
53  Think of the $MFT file as the table of contents for a hard drive 
that points you to the page of interest.54  That this file was not examined to determine 
what details existed about previously deleted files was a significant technical oversight 
that ignored valuable potential evidence.  This is critical because a review of the $MFT 
could have likely resolved the courts concern regarding intentional spoliation by 
specifically identifying the names and sizes of the files that had been recently deleted.55
¶16 The court also did not appear to understand that a vast majority of data in 




49 Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *5 n.13 (citing Leicht Aff. at ¶¶ 1–4, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Tr. 
At 251:6–252:11, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062). 
  The analogy here is expecting entire pristine 
documents in an area that consists mostly of confetti.  This is probably why TRI’s 
computer consultants never preserved the unallocated space before the encryption process 
was initiated.  The initial judicial preservation order issued by the court prohibited the 
50 Maxpower Corp. v. Abraham, 557 F. Supp. 2d 955, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (denying plaintiff’s motion 
for sanctions due to insufficient evidence showing that wiping of hard drive was deliberate spoliation even 
though the plaintiffs, computer forensics expert examined the defendants, laptops, finding evidence of hard 
drive wiping software and of text strings referring to information about outdated products).  
51 Wall & Lange, supra note 46. 
52 United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 489–90, 497 (7th Cir. 2009) (Defendant appealed his 
conviction, arguing that the government had destroyed or withheld exculpatory evidence and failed to 
provide forensic copies of hard drives, which resulted in a Brady violation.  In affirming the conviction, the 
court determined there was no Brady violation.  To support its ruling, the court noted that no destruction or 
spoliation on behalf of the government existed, there was a material lack of proof that certain alleged 
evidence was missing.); Floeter v. City of Orlando, No. 6:05-cv-400-Orl-22KRS, 2007 WL 486633, at *7 
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2007) (denying sanctions for lost hard drives and destroyed backup tapes); MGE UPS 
Sys., Inc. v. Fakouri Elec. Eng., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 724, 741–42 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2006). 
53 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World. 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 539–40 (2005). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 53, ¶ 8 n.22 (2004), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf. 
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destruction of any company related documents, books, or records.57
¶17 It is unreasonable for courts to expect litigants to preserve the unallocated space of 
their computers, or understand they are required to preserve unallocated space, as the 
result of a routine preservation order.
  It is not clear how 
Vice Chancellor Strine bridged the technology world from that routine mandate to the 
finding that deleted files, that per normal descriptive terms are already destroyed and are 
unrecoverable within the Windows Operating System, fall within those parameters.  A 
routine e-Discovery process paying no attention to deleted files was transformed, to the 
defendant’s disadvantage, into an e-Forensic investigation about deleted files. 
58  To expand preservation orders to include 
unallocated space in computers and servers on pain of sanction, as Vice Chancellor Strine 
now has done in the Delaware courts, is unworkable and unreasonable.59  To preserve this 
storage space, a company would effectively have to shut down all their computers and 
servers prior to imaging—grinding the business to a halt.60
¶18 Moreover, because of the random nature of the unallocated space, it is impossible 
to know with certainty where the previously deleted information sought is located.
  Even then, it is not always 
possible to recover deleted files from unallocated space, as opposed to random bits and 
pieces of the whole. 
61  It is 
a simple matter to segregate active files by custodian.  If employee John Smith has 
information regarding the litigation, you segregate his active files and search them for 
useful information.  With fragments of files, as typically found in unallocated space, no 
such segregation is possible.  The analogy here is searching for a needle in a field of 
haystacks.  The cost will always outweigh the benefits, if any, of such a search.62  For a 
company that has a number of servers, even the cost of imaging and maintaining the 
unallocated space, as will be required if unallocated space is now part of every “status 
quo” preservation order and litigation hold, may be prohibitively expensive.63
¶19 Finally, the court was correct to note that the timing of the wiping activity by TRI’s 
consultant, at night after everyone was done for the day, might provide reason for 
suspicion.  However, undertaking such a lengthy process at night is a common practice 
that minimizes the impact of the e-Discovery process on the business.
 
64  Accordingly, 
such actions on their own should not have led the court to conclude a nefarious intent.65
 
57 Status Quo Order, supra note 26. 
  
58 Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who Should 
Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 262 (2000). 
59 Allman, supra note 40. 
60 See Brownstone, supra note 57 (discussing the complexities of e-Discovery and the high costs 
associated with preserving data, the different methods of production and review, and the difficulties posed 
by judicial sanctions).  
61 Allman, supra note 40. 
62 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Exec. Office of the President, Nos. 07–1707, 07–
1577 (HHK/JMF), 2008 WL 2932173, at *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2008) (declining to order imaging of hard 
drives due to cost-benefit analysis); Giacobbe, supra note 59 at 262. 
63 Giacobbe, supra note 58 at 262. 
64 Id. 
65 United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 369–71 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (dismissing a spoliation claim 
finding lack of bad faith); Ed Schmidt Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Co., LLC, 575 F. 
Supp. 2d 837, 841–42 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (requiring evidence of intent to deprive opposing party of useful 
information for spoliation claim); New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Cuomo, No. 93 CV 
7146(RLC) JCF, 1998 WL 395320, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (declining to award spoliation sanctions 
where no showing of intentional failure to preserve electronically stored information). 
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Indeed, if the defendant’s consultant was really trying to hide his actions from discovery, 
he could easily have removed all forensic trace evidence of his wiping activities.66  The 
failure to do so supports the innocent explanation for the wipe offered by the defendant.67
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶20 Armed with partial or incomplete information regarding digital matters as noted 
above, courts unfortunately can reach the wrong conclusion.  As illustrated in TR 
Investors, LLC v. Genger, where the plaintiff successfully, but mistakenly, asserted the 
defendant committed spoliation of evidence and unwittingly led Vice Chancellor Strine 
to impose an unreasonable and expensive burden upon this defendant and all future 
litigants and companies in the State of Delaware—the burden of preserving unallocated 
space on pain of spoliation sanctions.68
 
66 Scalera v. Electrograph Sys. Inc., 262 F.R.D. 162, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (
 
declining to issue sanctions 
despite party’s negligent failure to preserve ESI). 
67 Port Auth. Police Asian Jade Soc’y of N.Y. and N.J. Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 601 F. Supp. 
2d 566, 570–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying sanctions despite document destruction and finding other 
available evidentiary sources available); Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 369–71 (Defendant argued the 
government destroyed important and potentially exculpatory evidence.  Despite determining data was 
altered after the government opened a floppy disk, the court found the defendant failed to demonstrate the 
government acted in bad faith or that the alteration prejudiced his case, and denied the motion to dismiss 
based on spoliation.); Gippetti v. UPS, Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW(HRL), 2008 WL 3264483, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 6, 2008) (denying spoliation claim finding destruction in accordance with retention policy); 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, No. H-06-2849, 2006 WL 3837518, at *27–28 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 
2006) (The plaintiff asked the court for sanctions based on spoliation of evidence.  It argued the defendant 
deliberately destroyed evidence when he was under a preservation obligation.  The court ruled there was 
not enough evidence in the record at that time to demonstrate the defendant destroyed records in bad faith.); 
Williams v. Saint-Gobain Corp., No. 00-CV-0502E(SC) 2002 WL 1477618, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 
2002) (refusing to award sanctions for withholding or destroying emails where no evidence of bad faith). 
68 Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KEV-GLR, 2007 WL 2225946, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2007) 
(refusing to compel production of personal hard drive); Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 
F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (refusing to issue sanctions for spoliation of electronic evidence). 
